Beginning approximately a decade and a half ago, it was suggested that some structures that are considered to be part of the ''medial temporal lobe memory system'' could play a role in perception as well. The implications of this view, interpreted broadly, are that medial temporal lobe structures may be understood as an extension of the ventral visual stream and that their functions cannot be described exclusively in terms of memory. Considerable evidence now supports the view that medial temporal lobe structures are involved in nonmnemonic aspects of cognition, such as perception. This discovery allows for a fuller understanding of the involvement of these structures in mental phenomena than does a purely mnemonic account of their function. See the related review by Suzuki, ''Perception and the Medial Temporal Lobe: Evaluating the Current Evidence,'' in this issue of Neuron.
Structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL), including the hippocampus and connected areas (entorhinal, perirhinal, parahippocampal cortex), have been proposed to constitute a ''medial temporal lobe memory system'' that is specialized for memory functions in the mammalian brain. Although it is acknowledged that these are not the only structures in the brain that are involved in memory-for example, the medial diencephalon is critical for memory (Aggleton and Mishkin, 1983; Mitchell et al., 2007; Victor et al., 1989; Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1985) -the primary functions of these areas are thought to be in storage and recall of facts and events (Squire and Knowlton, 2000; Squire et al., 2004) . In particular, the MTL ''(a) is principally concerned with memory, (b) operates with neocortex to establish and maintain long-term memory, and (c) ultimately, through a process of consolidation, becomes independent of long-term memory'' (Squire et al., 2004, p. 279 ). The precise extent to which particular elements of this system are differentially involved in specific aspects of memory remains a topic of discussion: for example, are structures within this system further specialized for particular types or modalities of memory, or do they work together as a unitary memory system (Murray and Wise, 2004) ?
Notwithstanding these considerations, a central tenet of this characterization of the MTL is that its primary function is in memory and not in other aspects of cognition (Squire et al., 2004) . However, beginning $15 years ago, experimental data began to suggest that MTL structures may be involved in perceptual functions as well. Thus, an alternative hypothesis about the involvement of the MTL in cognition has emerged which suggests that perceptual functions of these cortical areas are just as important as their involvement in memory, or indeed that apparently disparate mnemonic and perceptual functions may arise from common computational mechanisms Murray et al., 2007) . According to this view, ''the perirhinal cortex'' (a component of the MTL) ''represents information about objects for both mnemonic and perceptual purposes'' (Murray et al., 2007, p. 99) . This differs from the standard view of MTL function, which holds that its main function is in memory. Thus, establishing that MTL structures play an important role in online perceptual processing would falsify the standard view of MTL function.
This article will review, briefly, the evidence that has been interpreted as demonstrating a role for MTL structures in perceptual functions as opposed to strictly mnemonic functions. It will draw from studies in animals and humans, and from both experiments, such as investigations of effects of lesions or temporary inactivations, and correlational approaches, such as functional neuroimaging and behavioral neurophysiology. The differences in interpretation of these findings will also be discussed. As the goal of these paired articles is to synthesize and integrate disparate views of a single literature, some possible avenues for future work will be outlined, but these are also discussed more extensively in the accompanying commentary (Suzuki and Baxter, 2009) . A central theme running through this work is the extent to which perceptual and mnemonic functions can be differentiated from one another, both psychologically and behaviorally, a topic to which I will return at the end of the paper.
Some Effects of Perirhinal Cortex Lesions
Are Consistent with an Impairment in Perception As far as I am aware, Eacott, Gaffan, and Murray (Eacott et al., 1994) were the first to propose that the rhinal cortex (comprising entorhinal and perirhinal cortex) may be involved in visual identification and perceptual function, similar to the laterally adjacent cortical area TE. This study is of interest, therefore, for historical reasons, but also because it serves to highlight some key issues in the interpretation of findings from lesion studies that attempt to address the role of defined cortical structures in cognition. These authors trained macaque monkeys preoperatively on several visual recognition memory tasks (delayed matching-tosample, DMS) in an automated apparatus. In this paradigm, one or more visual objects (images on a computer screen) are presented as ''sample'' objects, and then choice tests are offered in which the monkey is allowed to select either the sample object or a foil that was not presented during the sample phase. In DMS, the monkey is rewarded for selecting the object that appeared as a sample during the sample phase of that particular test trial. In the more common delayed nonmatchingto-sample, or DNMS, the monkey is rewarded for choosing the other object that was not presented as a sample; see Figure 1 of Suzuki (2009) . Eacott et al. (1994) found that monkeys with rhinal cortex lesions were impaired in delayed matching-tosample performance, but this impairment was mitigated by reducing the set size of objects from which the recognition memory test was drawn and was eliminated entirely by reducing the set of objects to two. Thus, monkeys with rhinal cortex lesions could perform delayed matching-to-sample, a canonical test of visual recognition memory, normally as long as the pool from which the objects to be remembered were drawn was very small (two). Moreover, with large sets of objects, deficits could be seen even when the stimuli to be matched were presented simultaneously, or when a 0 s delay separated sample and choice.
Although tasks such as DMS and DNMS are designed to study memory rather than perceptual function, these findings were interpreted as possibly suggesting a visual perceptual deficit, rather than a mnemonic one, following lesions of the rhinal cortex. Thus, some features of impaired and spared performance may shed light on whether rhinal cortex damage impairs perceptual function in addition to memory. Impaired performance in the absence of memory demands (simultaneous and 0 s matching conditions) suggested an impairment in some aspect of perceptual processing. The significance of this finding has been criticized because a subsequent study reported that monkeys with selective perirhinal cortex lesions were unimpaired at learning a DNMS task with a 0.5 s delay between sample and choice (Buffalo et al., 2000 ; see also Suzuki, 2009 ), but because performance of these monkeys was not statistically significantly different from that of controls at any delay (including 10 min delays between sample and choice), this result is difficult to interpret. The statistical significance of the original finding of Eacott et al. (1994) has also been questioned because it depends on pooling data from several test conditions (Buffalo et al., 2000; Suzuki, 2009) . Eacott et al. also showed that if the monkey was very familiar with the objects to be remembered in the DMS task, because they were used repeatedly across trials instead of being unique from trial to trial, the rhinal cortex was apparently not required for remembering which one had been seen in the sample trial. This also supports a perceptual view of MTL function, because when there was no demand on discrimination between the stimuli, the rhinal cortex was also not necessary to remember them during the delay between sample and choice. It might be argued that this version of DMS no longer taxes visual recognition memory but instead taxes working or recency memory. That is, rather than simply recognizing whether a stimulus has been seen before, the monkey must remember which of the two stimuli he saw on the sample trial immediately preceding the current choice trial in order to respond correctly. However, it is not obvious why a similar strategy could not be applied to choice trials with trial-unique stimuli.
At the time of the Eacott et al. (1994) study, it had been demonstrated that lesions of entorhinal cortex, perirhinal cortex, or both together impaired DNMS with trial-unique objects (Meunier et al., 1993) and that lesions of rhinal cortex impaired DMS but left object discrimination learning intact (Gaffan and Murray, 1992) . Furthermore, lesions of perirhinal and parahippocampal cortex together impaired DNMS in both visual and tactual modalities, indicating that the deficit in DNMS performance extended beyond the visual modality (Suzuki et al., 1993) . (For a review of the literature on stimulus recognition leading up to the focus on the rhinal cortex, see Murray, 1996 .) The finding that monkeys with rhinal cortex lesions could succeed at DMS when tested with familiar stimuli and that deficits in DMS could be seen with no or minimal memory demands challenged the notion that the rhinal cortex was responsible for all aspects of stimulus memory, although it certainly was not an unambiguous demonstration of a perceptual function of rhinal cortex.
A series of studies from Buckley and Gaffan extended this initial observation. These authors reported that perirhinal cortex lesions impaired concurrent discrimination learning with large, but not small, sets of objects, as well as transfer of discrimination learning between 2D and 3D representations of the same objects and generalization of discrimination learning to new views of familiar objects , 1998a , 1998b . These findings support a role for perirhinal cortex in being able to perceptually identify objects, not just remember them. Again, these data are not unambiguous. For example, it has been argued that the set-size effects on discrimination learning simply represent a magnification of a unitary impairment per problem (Hampton, 2005) such that this impairment does not reach significance with a small number of discriminations but the additive effect across a large number of discriminations creates a significant difference from controls. Another criticism of these experiments is that the impairment in transfer between 3D objects and 2D photographs of the same objects could just reflect an impairment in discrimination learning, but this criticism can be rejected on the basis of reanalysis of data from this experiment, showing impairment in monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions even on the first trial of each problem (Buckley, 2005) .
A subsequent experiment provided a more explicit test of perceptual function by examining performance of monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions on oddity discriminations with a number of different types of stimulus material (Buckley et al., 2001) . Monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions were impaired on oddity problems based on different viewpoints of objects, degraded images of objects, human and monkey faces presented from different viewpoints, and visual scenes, but not on problems based on color, shape, or size, irrespective of the difficulty of particular problems, or same-viewpoint presentations of human or monkey faces. Because the impairments were observed on discriminations taxing complex object discrimination and not on difficult discriminations per se, this argues in favor of a perceptual deficit rather than a problem with memory. On the other hand, although associations with particular stimuli and reward could not be used to solve the oddity problems (because individual stimuli appeared equally often as the odd one out and the foils), it could be argued that the impairment in these tasks is expressed through learning as a consequence of repeated exposure to particular objects, or association of different views of the same stimuli with one another, and therefore has more to do with memory function than with perception (Suzuki, 2009 ). These limitations can be addressed, to some extent, through the use of an oddity task with trial-unique stimuli (discussed later in this article).
Formal Models of Perirhinal Cortex Involvement in Perceptual Function
One problem with all of these experiments is that the definition of what constitutes ''perception'' is nebulous. devised a computational model in order to make explicit predictions of how damage to perirhinal cortex would affect performance in visual learning tasks, based on the idea that the perirhinal cortex is a rostral extension of the ventral visual stream that is specialized to process conjunctions of simple perceptual features. In this model, the perirhinal cortex is at the apex of a hierarchically organized system of visual cortical areas. By virtue of its position in the hierarchy, the perirhinal cortex is required to resolve discriminations with a high degree of ''feature ambiguity,'' which occurs when the stimuli to be discriminated have a large number of features in common. However, this does not solve the problem of deciding what a ''feature'' is. Some neuropsychological data bear on this point, for example that ablations of the middle temporal gyrus (including much of area TE) impair color discrimination but not DNMS, whereas the reverse pattern is obtained with lesions of perirhinal cortex . Nevertheless, the model does make explicit predictions about performance in a number of tasks in which ''features'' are operationally defined. For example, discrimination problems that can only be solved based on a combination of features should require the perirhinal cortex for their solution. One case of this is the biconditional discrimination problem, of the form AB+, CD+, BCÀ, ADÀ, where each capital letter represents an individual feature and each pair of letters represents an individual stimulus that is associated with reward (+) or nonreward (À). When confronted with a stimulus (for example AB), it is only possible to know whether that stimulus is rewarded based on the combination of features A and B, because A and B individually are each also part of nonrewarded stimuli. Thus, a biconditional visual discrimination problem requires processing of feature conjunctions-because each individual feature is ambiguous-and should be impaired by perirhinal cortex damage. In contrast, a discrimination problem of the form AB+, CD+, EFÀ, GHÀ could be solved on the basis of individual features: A only appears as part of the rewarded stimulus AB. Because each feature is unambiguous, this discrimination problem-which also requires learning about four stimuli, each composed of two features-should not require perirhinal cortex. An important property of these discrimination problems is that they should place equal demands on memory, because the number of stimuli to be associated with reward (or nonreward) is the same in each case.
Bussey, Saksida, and Murray tested this prediction directly in monkeys with lesions of perirhinal cortex, by training them on visual discrimination problems in conditions of minimal, intermediate, or maximal feature ambiguity (Figure 1 ). On the view that perirhinal cortex is involved in visual learning and memory irrespective of the degree of feature ambiguity within the visual discrimination problem, one would predict that perirhinal cortex lesions would produce equivalent impairments in all three conditions. Alternatively, if perirhinal cortex is required for solving visual discrimination problems only when resolution of feature ambiguity is required, then the degree of impairment should interact with the perceptual demands of the visual discrimination problem. This latter pattern of performance is exactly what was found (Figure 1) . Importantly, the specification of ''feature ambiguity'' as a critical factor in determining whether perirhinal cortex is necessary for solving a visual task is consistent with the observation that rotating or otherwise degrading previously learned visual stimuli affects the performance of control monkeys and monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions similarly (Hampton and Murray, 2002) . Because these manipulations do not affect the degree of feature ambiguity, they would not be expected to produce any impairment after damage to perirhinal cortex (and indeed they do not).
It may still be argued that this result tells us nothing about visual perception, because the impairment is expressed in the context of a learning problem. Alternatively, if the demands on learning and memory are consistent between the various task conditions (which they were in this study), then it is difficult to attribute any observed deficits to impaired learning or memory. Instead, it seems that the feature ambiguity manipulation is critical in determining whether the perirhinal cortex is involved in the task, rather than any demands on learning and memory per se. Furthermore, it is difficult to attribute the impairment to damage to cortical areas outside of perirhinal cortex, both because the perirhinal cortex lesions in were extremely discrete and because such damage (which would most likely be located in laterally adjacent area TE) would produce impairments in visual discrimination learning regardless of the degree of perceptual ambiguity (Buffalo et al., 1998 (Buffalo et al., , 1999 Iwai and Mishkin, 1968) .
Remarkably, the same pattern of impairment in discrimination learning is seen in humans with temporal cortex lesions that include the perirhinal cortex (Barense et al., 2005) . Subjects in this study with lesions limited to the hippocampus, who were amnesic, were not impaired in any aspect of visual discrimination learning, consistent with the effect of selective hippocampal lesions in monkeys . However, subjects in the MTL lesion group were impaired as a function of the degree of feature ambiguity within problems (Figure 2 ), just as monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions are. Related experiments have used a ''morphing'' approach to create feature ambiguity between visual stimuli and have examined impairments in learning ''morphed'' discriminations in monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions, or in performance on probe trials of ''morphed'' stimuli created from ''unmorphed'' photographs that monkeys have learned to discriminate. Again perirhinal cortex lesions are without effect on single-pair discrimination learning of ''unmorphed'' photographs, but impairments emerge as the degree of feature ambiguity, created by ''morphing,'' increases (Bussey et al., 2003 . Some studies have reported similar findings in humans with MTL damage (Lee et al., 2005b (Lee et al., , 2007 ; cf. Levy et al., 2005; Shrager et al., 2006) , although there are concerns about the anatomical specificity of MTL damage in patients that are impaired on these tasks (discussed in the next section and by Suzuki, 2009 ).
These investigations have focused on the involvement of perirhinal cortex in perceptual function. It has been suggested that other components of the MTL may also have perceptual functions, such as the hippocampus. Humans with apparently selective hippocampal lesions were impaired at oddity discriminations among virtual-reality ''scenes'' (Lee et al., 2005a;  Figure 3) . A separate study of a different group of humans with hippocampal lesions examined performance in a simultaneous matching-tosample task with topographical relations in visual scenes and found impairments in two of the four patients, although all four were impaired when a 2 s delay was introduced between sample and choice (Hartley et al., 2007) . Although this latter result suggests a more reliable impairment in very short-term memory for spatial relationships rather than perception per se following hippocampal damage, neither finding is consistent with the viewpoint that the hippocampus is only required to maintain memory beyond the capacity of short-term/working memory (cf. Shrager et al., 2008) . These findings, taken together, may suggest a role for the hippocampus in the perception of scenes, in the same manner as the perirhinal cortex is involved in the Example minimum and maximum feature ambiguity problems are illustrated. Each column shows a set of four problems, represented as a screen that would be presented to the monkey. Each problem contains one rewarded stimulus (in the + column) and one unrewarded stimulus (in the À column); the left/right position of the stimuli was random for each trial. Each stimulus is composed of two grayscale photographs apposed to one another; the monkey's task was to choose one pair of photographs by touching it. Each individual photograph composes a ''feature'' of the stimulus, so each stimulus is composed nominally of two features. In the minimum feature ambiguity problem, each feature appears only once as part of a stimulus, so each feature is either always rewarded or never rewarded. For example, the photograph of bandages is always part of a rewarded stimulus, and the photograph of the surgeon is always part of an unrewarded stimulus. In the maximum feature ambiguity problem, each feature appears as part of a rewarded stimulus and as part of an unrewarded stimulus, so it is impossible to solve the task without relying on conjunctions of features because each individual feature is ambiguous. For example, the image of the ''duck crossing'' sign is part of a rewarded stimulus in combination with the ''Lot 6'' sign, but part of an unrewarded stimulus when in combination with the picture of the child. Intermediate feature ambiguity problems (not illustrated) have some features that are ambiguous and some that are not. Monkeys with PRh lesions are unimpaired at learning sets of discrimination problems with minimum feature ambiguity but are impaired at learning sets of problems with intermediate or maximum feature ambiguity. Thus, the perceptual qualities of the visual stimuli, rather than the memory demands of the task, determine whether an impairment is seen. Error bars indicate ± SEM. Adapted from Figures 4, 6, and 7 of , by permission of Wiley-Blackwell. (Barense et al., 2005) Two kinds of stimuli (''barcodes'' and ''bugs'') are illustrated, with three different problem sets in each. The problems are constructed in the same way as those used in testing monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions (Figure 1) . For the barcodes, the ''features'' are the left and right halves of each barcode; for the bugs, the features are the body type and the legs. In the example illustrated with the bugs, in the minimum feature ambiguity condition, both body type and legs are unambiguous; there are four different body types and four different leg shapes, and each body type or leg shape is part of an always-rewarded bug or a never-rewarded bug. Thus, it is possible to solve this discrimination by focusing on the presence or absence of individual features. In the intermediate feature ambiguity condition illustrated, body type is ambiguous: there are only two different body types, and each body type is part of an always-rewarded bug or a never-rewarded bug equally often. In the maximum feature ambiguity condition, there are only two body types and two leg shapes, and all are ambiguous: each body type and leg shape is part of an always-rewarded bug and a never-rewarded bug. Thus, the conjunction of leg shape and body type must be used in order to solve the problems, because each individual leg shape and body type is ambiguous. Performance of amnesic humans with either restricted hippocampal damage or larger MTL lesions including perirhinal cortex is shown in comparison with age-matched, neurologically intact control participants. Humans with hippocampal lesions learn all the discrimination problems normally, regardless of feature ambiguity, but humans with MTL lesions are impaired as a function of feature ambiguity. Error bars indicate ± SEM. Adapted from Figures 2 and 3 of Barense et al. (2005) . Reprinted by permission of The Journal of Neuroscience. perception of objects (Murray et al., 2007) . However, this hypothesis remains speculative pending accumulation of further data, in particular from studies in animals in which discrete hippocampal lesions can be produced experimentally. This is an important avenue for future investigations.
What Are the Criticisms of a Role for MTL Structures in Perception?
Some criticisms of these experiments have already been alluded to. They fall primarily into two categories, related to anatomical and cognitive specificity of impairments. First, it has been argued that the extent of brain damage in amnesic patients who are impaired on ''perceptual'' tasks has not been adequately delineated, and damage outside the MTL may be able to account for their perceptual impairments without needing to hypothesize a role for MTL structures in perceptual function. For example, Shrager et al. (2006) have suggested that patients tested by Lee, Barense, and colleagues (Barense et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2005b) may have damage in temporal cortical structures outside the MTL that can account for their perceptual impairments (see also Suzuki, 2009 ). Recent volumetric analyses of the extent of Participants view displays of four objects, three views of the same face or scene and one of a different face or scene, and are asked to identify the ''odd one out.'' In ''same-view'' problems, the three images of the same face or scene are presented from the same viewpoint; in ''differentview'' problems, the three images of the same face or scene are presented from different viewpoints. All participants find it easy to identify the odd stimulus in ''same-view'' face and scene oddity problems. Humans with hippocampal lesions are unimpaired relative to their agematched controls (''young controls'') on differentview face oddity, but are impaired in differentview scene oddity. Notably, controls find these kinds of problems equally difficult, so this is not the result of a task-difficulty effect. Humans with MTL damage that extends beyond the hippocampus into the adjacent cortex (including perirhinal cortex) are impaired in both face and scene oddity problems with different views, relative to their age-matched controls (''elderly controls''). Error bars indicate ± SEM. Adapted from Figures 3 and 6 of Lee et al. (2005a) by permission. lesions in this patient population support the conclusions drawn from visual ratings of MRI scans (A.C. Lee et al., 2008 , Society for Neuroscience, abstract; A.C.H. Lee, personal communication, July 14, 2008) , so it is unlikely that there is undetected damage in these patients that has not been described.
In any case, this is an issue with any lesion analysis in human patient populations, where the lesion extent is variable and, in the case of neurodegenerative diseases, progressive. The striking similarity between the performance of monkeys with discrete perirhinal cortex lesions and that of humans with broader MTL damage on nearly identical tasks is compelling in terms of localization of the perceptual deficits to the MTL. Converging information from fMRI in neurologically intact humans reveals perirhinal cortex activation correlated with oddity judgments (Devlin and Price, 2007; Lee et al., 2008) as well as for other aspects of object processing associated with feature ambiguity (Tyler et al., 2004; Moss et al., 2005) that are impaired by MTL lesions (Moss et al., 2005) . This correlational evidence provides confirmation of the neuroanatomical locus of these functions in intact brains, because it is not possible to localize function with this degree of specificity based on lesions in human patients. Although neurophysiological data have indicated similarity in visual properties of neurons in perirhinal cortex and laterally adjacent area TE (Suzuki, 2009 ), these firing correlates may reflect information passing between these areas. Disruption of activity in perirhinal cortex or TE while recording in the complementary area could help resolve this question (see, for example, Higuchi and Miyashita, 1996) . Two other points are noteworthy in this context. First, to the extent that damage outside of core MTL structures accounts for perceptual impairments in visual discrimination and oddity tasks in humans with MTL damage, it is not clear why this damage would cause impairments that are related to the degree of feature ambiguity in the stimuli that are presented. Second, there is little variability in the performance of the MTL patients whose lesion localization has been questioned (those tested by Lee et al., 2005a Lee et al., , 2005b , despite differences in the extent of damage outside of core MTL structures (Suzuki, 2009) . For example, if lateral temporal damage is responsible for the discrepant performance of MTL patients in Lee et al. (2005b) and Shrager et al. (2006) , then the subject with the most lateral temporal damage (MTL1) should be dramatically worse than the other two MTL patients on the perceptual tasks, but this is not the case.
The second criticism is that cognitive impairments that are apparently perceptual are instead the result of impaired memory. There are at least two ways in which impaired learning and memory could account for effects ascribed to impaired perception. First, it could be the case that feature-ambiguous discrimination problems are simply more difficult and therefore unmask a subtle impairment in visual discrimination learning caused by perirhinal cortex lesions. But Buckley et al. (2001) show that there is no relationship between discrimination difficulty, per se, and impairment (or lack thereof) in their monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions, so it cannot be that oddity problems that require ''object identification'' or discrimination of feature ambiguity are simply more difficult. Similarly, color and size discriminations that are equally difficult to feature-ambiguous discriminations were learned normally by monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions (Bussey et al., 2003) . Second, because the impairments in oddity discrimination in monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions occur over the course of repeated presentations of oddity problems, they could simply reflect an impairment in visual discrimination learning or long-term familiarity with the stimuli. But learning is not apparent across blocks of oddity problems in humans (Lee et al., 2005a) . Similarly, when monkeys learn to discriminate a pair of target images and perception is probed with probe trials with morphed stimuli, learning is not seen across probe trials (Bussey et al., 2003 . It seems imparsimonious to hypothesize a memory deficit which is not strong enough to impair discrimination learning but results in impairment in probe trials as a function of feature ambiguity (Suzuki, 2009 ). When the memory demands are constant across the various task conditions and the only variable that is manipulated is feature ambiguity, it is difficult to explain oddity discrimination impairments and impairments in discriminating high featureambiguity stimuli in terms of anything other than a perceptual impairment . The argument that higher feature-ambiguity discriminations place a greater demand on memory because the degree of detail required to discriminate the stimuli is greater (Suzuki, 2009 ) is simply an appeal to a task difficulty explanation, and there is ample evidence that monkeys (and humans) with MTL damage are not impaired on difficult discrimination problems. Nevertheless, these are problems with any procedure in which trial-unique stimuli are not presented. Recent studies in human patients with MTL damage (Barense et al., 2007) and rats (Bartko et al., 2007) , which also find impairments in oddity discrimination in high feature-ambiguity conditions using trial-unique stimulus presentation, can address this limitation.
It is also notable that different investigators have reported different results from patients with MTL lesions on apparently similar tasks. For example, Stark and Squire (2000) report intact oddity-discrimination performance in two amnesic patients with large MTL lesions, whereas Lee et al. (2005a) report odditydiscrimination impairments in their amnesic patients. These differences have been attributed by some, as mentioned, to differences in the location and specificity of MTL lesions. It is also worth comparing the performance of control subjects across different investigations on various tasks. For example, the control subjects in Stark and Squire (2000) find some of the perceptual tasks as difficult as the amnesic patients do in Lee et al. (2005a) . Both studies tested oddity discriminations with displays of six faces, five orientations of one face and a sixth different face (experiment 1 of Lee et al., 2005a , and task 7 of Stark and Squire, 2000) using apparently nearly identical procedures. The control subjects in Stark and Squire (2000) perform at $68.2% correct on face oddity and the MTL subjects at 57.3% correct (estimated from their Figure 4) . In Lee et al. (2005a) , the control subjects perform at $88.3% correct on face oddity and the MTL subjects at 62.3% correct (estimated from their Figure 4 ). Thus, some apparent differences in results between laboratories may relate to the control data that are used for comparison, rather than the effects of MTL damage per se, although in other cases performance of control subjects is well matched across studies (Lee et al., 2005b; Shrager et al., 2006; discussion in Suzuki, 2009) . This is an issue that is difficult to address given geographic, demographic, and other differences between patient populations that are tested by different groups of investigators. Ideally, investigators would attempt to make their patients and control subjects accessible to testing by other research groups, in an attempt to exclude possible methodological or other confounds that might complicate comparison of results across different laboratories. (For example, the surgical method used to produce hippocampal damage in monkeys was excluded as a factor for interlaboratory differences in effects of hippocampal damage on recognition memory by testing monkeys operated by one group of investigators in the laboratory of another group of investigators [ZolaMorgan and Squire, 1986] .) Other differences are more difficult to resolve: Shrager et al. (2006) used trial-unique presentations of ''morphed'' discriminations, using similar stimuli to Lee et al. (2005b) , and failed to find impairments in their population of amnesic patients. This may be unique to the ''morphing'' discriminations, which may be solvable based on identification of single features when simultaneously presented pictures are compared, and thus do not adequately tax feature ambiguity (M.D. Barense, personal communication, May 9, 2008; Figure 4) .
I have discussed arguments for and against the interpretation of behavioral impairments after MTL damage as a consequence of impaired perception rather than memory. Another argument against a role for the MTL in perception is that preserved performance in some tasks is indicative of intact perception after MTL damage. For example, preserved performance at short delays in recognition memory tasks is often taken as evidence that subjects have intact perceptual function, attention, motivation, and understanding of the task rules, in addition to intact memory at short delays between sample and choice. There are several difficulties with this argument. First, extensive training at short delays is often required to achieve good performance at short delays between sample and choice in monkeys with MTL lesions, whether they were trained preoperatively in recognition memory or not (e.g., Meunier et al., 1993; Zola-Morgan et al., 1989) . This may introduce a bias in performance favoring the short delay that is trained extensively (Ringo, 1993) . Second, monkeys with MTL damage may fail to learn recognition memory tasks even after extensive training (e.g., Suzuki et al., 1993) , challenging the conclusion that the only effect of these lesions is on intermediate-or long-term memory. Third, even when there are no differences in performance at short delays, typically the objects used are not designed to tax the hypothesized perceptual functions of the MTL (that is, they are not explicitly feature ambiguous). Finally, the delay dependence of many MTL lesion effects on recognition memory performance may be related to the use of a percent correct scale of measurement, because these effects are not delay dependent when analyzed in a d' metric (Baxter and Murray, 2001; Ringo, 1988 Ringo, , 1991 . Thus, the effect of MTL lesions on performance of tasks like DNMS may not necessarily reflect memory impairment. It may be possible to explain these lesion effects in terms of a similar computational mechanism to that which is involved in resolution of feature ambiguity in discrimination learning (Cowell et al., 2006) .
How Does a Perceptual/''Perceptual-Mnemonic'' View of MTL Function Advance the Understanding of the Organization of Brain Systems for Cognition? Why might it be useful to consider that MTL structures, including perirhinal cortex and hippocampus, may play a role in perception as well as in memory? Considerable effort has been devoted to identifying which structures in the MTL are essential for memory function, as well as the potential for different MTL structures to be involved in different aspects of memory (for instance, semantic versus, episodic, or recognition versus recall). This remains extremely controversial, and I will not attempt to address these controversies here. However, a role for MTL in perception may allow for an explanation of some experimental observations that a purely mnemonic account of MTL function does not.
The ''perceptual-mnemonic'' Murray et al., 2007) hypothesis may provide a framework to understand effects of MTL damage on tasks like visual discrimination learning that cannot readily be accommodated in terms of an exclusive role for the MTL in memory. According to this view, neurons in the MTL encode representations of objects or scenes that are necessary for both perception and memory. The prevailing view of MTL involvement in memory is that the MTL is specialized for declarative memory, that is, memory for facts and events that in humans is consciously accessible (Squire and Knowlton, 2000; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991) . It has been difficult, a priori, to decide whether a learning and memory task is ''declarative'' or not without making reference to the performance of amnesic patients on the task (or the performance of animals with lesions of structures within the MTL). Of course, this leads to problems with circularity of definitions, which have been previously discussed (Morris, 1984; Nadel, 1992) . For example, visual discrimination learning has been suggested to be ''declarative'' on the basis that it is rapidly acquired (Teng et al., 2000) . However, discrimination problems that are learned rapidly do not necessarily require the hippocampus (Broadbent et al., 2007; Jonasson et al., 2004) . Indeed, the maximum feature ambiguity discrimination problems tend to be learned more slowly, yet these are the ones that are impaired by MTL lesions. Thus, there is nothing ''declarative'' or not about visual discrimination learning, although such problems may be acquired by different learning mechanisms, some slow and some fast, perhaps in parallel in neurologically intact humans (Bayley et al., 2005; Hood et al., 1999) . Although it is difficult to account for these data with a purely mnemonic hypothesis of MTL function, they are readily explained by the ''perceptualmnemonic'' view.
Another advantage of this point of view is that it may explain the dependence of memory impairments in amnesia on stimulus modality that are difficult to accommodate in other ways. A subject asked to judge which of two blended images (on the left and right) is most similar to the middle image may be able to do so by focusing on individual features of the images, potentially limiting the utility of these types of problems for assessing the impact of MTL damage on perception. In the top row, the baseball player's belt is clearly more apparent in one blended image than the other (red arrowheads), rendering this discrimination a shading judgment rather than a test of feature ambiguity. Similarly, in the bottom row, the darkness of the animal's nose (arrowheads) provides a single feature that can be focused on. Top row adapted from Figure 5 of Levy et al. (2005) Patients with hippocampal damage show intact perceptual learning and categorization of faces, but not of virtual-reality scenes (Graham et al., 2006) . Not only are these tasks thought to be ''nondeclarative'' and therefore independent of the MTL, but there is no reason to expect the hippocampus to be involved in memory for scenes but not faces if it has a general role in declarative memory. Similarly, recognition memory for scenes is impaired in patients with amnesia consequent to hippocampal damage, but recognition memory for faces is not Taylor et al., 2007) . A dissociation between impaired recognition memory for words, but intact recognition memory for faces, in patients with hippocampal damage has been attributed to hippocampal involvement in providing contextual support for recognition of familiar items . A role for the hippocampus in representation of spatial or contextual information, used for both perception and memory, is able to account for all of these observations.
It is clear that many questions remain to be resolved in trying to understand the contributions of MTL structures to memory and perception. However, progress in this area depends on at least acknowledging the possibility that the involvement of MTL structures in cognition extends beyond the domain of memory. It is common to argue that ''perception'' is intact after MTL damage because humans or animals with MTL damage perform normally on some tasks that are thought to tax perceptual functions. For example, because monkeys with MTL damage can perform the DNMS task at short delays with minimal memory demand (Suzuki, 2009 ), or because rotating or masking visual stimuli in monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions is no more deleterious to their performance than it is in controls, then their perceptual functions must be intact (Buffalo et al., 1999; Hampton and Murray, 2002; Squire et al., 2004) . But, as indicated earlier, these tasks do not adequately tax the perceptual functions that MTL structures are thought to mediate. The use of feature ambiguity to tax perceptual discriminations among visual stimuli may tap into the role of perirhinal cortex in mediating object identification function more generally (Murray et al., 2000) . The finding that some aspects of perceptual function are intact after perirhinal cortex damage no more excludes a role for perirhinal cortex in perception, than the finding that some aspects of memory function are intact after hippocampal damage excludes a role for the hippocampus in memory.
The strong version of the ''perceptual-mnemonic'' view of MTL function argues that it is not useful to distinguish between ''perception'' and ''memory'' as psychological functions, to the extent that they may arise from a single mechanism at the neural level. Most would agree that a difference in forgetting rate, when it has been established that information has been acquired to the same degree, reflects an impairment in memory rather than perception. Similarly, most would agree that tasks in which performance depends on simultaneous comparison of trialunique stimuli tax perceptual function rather than memory. However, these ''folk psychological'' views of cognition may impede progress toward understanding how cognitive functions arise from the physiological activity of the brain (e.g., Bussey, 2004) . It is challenging to move beyond these views, especially given the compelling phenomenology of densely amnesic patients with MTL lesions, who present with amnesia rather than agnosia. Nevertheless, the accumulation of evidence that patients with MTL damage have cognitive impairments that extend beyond memory forces a reconsideration of the view that the function of the MTL is exclusively concerned with memory. Rather than trying to determine the location in the brain of a sharp line between perception and memory, it may be worth viewing MTL function in terms of representational capacities that are used for both cognitive processes (Murray et al., 2007) . Indeed, it is likely that the influence between apparently separate processes of ''perception'' and ''memory'' is bidirectional, with stored representations affecting online sensory processing (e.g., Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002) . The recent demonstration that patients with selective hippocampal damage are impaired, not just in recalling past events, but in imagining future ones (Hassabis et al., 2007) suggests that even the hippocampus, for decades the single structure in the brain most closely identified with memory function, may also be necessary for the perception and representation of episodes, not merely their storage and recall. These investigations promise a fuller understanding of how brain function gives rise to the phenomena of mind.
